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Abstract
It is now over a year since the Working Time Regulations entered force in Britain on 1 October 1998, during a period when the government also introduced the minimum wage. But whereas that piece of legislation appears to have faded away into the background of British industrial relations, the Working Time Regulations continue to remain a central topic, as evidenced by the press coverage given to the recent annual conference of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in Brighton.
i Based on a survey of British companies and organisations, this article reviews the manner in which the legislation was implemented and examines the scope of coverage.
ii It finds that the failure of the Labour government to consult the social partners -employer and employee representatives -resulted in business being unprepared for the Regulations.
The article also notes that the manner in which this legislation was introduced has meant that many of the employees who were working excessive hours are continuing to do so.
Overview
The implementation of the Working Time Regulations on 1 October 1998 ended nearly a decade of British opposition to European Union (EU) attempts to regulate working conditions (see appendix 1). And although the Regulations do not implement the whole of the Working Time Directive, Britain has for the first time provisions that include a statutory limit on average weekly hours; a statutory requirement for breaks throughout the day, at the end of the day and every week or fortnight; a general statutory provision for paid annual holidays; controls on the length of night shift working; and the provision of protection for young workers (see appendix 2). The effectiveness of these provisions is, however, diluted by the ability for workers to opt-out from the 48-hour maximum working week, which is a singular exception among EU states.
Of other points, the provision for paid holiday entitlement is weakened by the ability for public holidays to be counted as part of any holiday right. A perceived need to reflect these differing pressures did not result in the government embarking in a formal negotiating process involving the social partners.
Instead, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) sought to obtain business and trade union views by means of a scheduled consultation period from April to July 1998 (when the finalised regulations were placed before Parliament). An absence of round table bargaining that involved all parties mirrored the stance adopted by the previous Conservative administration, and consequently resulted in bilateral rather than multilateral discussions. The end product of this was an absence of hard bargaining between all parties as to what was and was not attainable, and the resulting absence of any real recommendations.
iv A lack of social partner dialogue was a strategic objective by the government to ensure that its viewpoints were not compromised through a formal consultation procedure.
This contrasted with the experience of the minimum wage, where the evidence collection exercise meant that trade unions, employer representatives and employers knew that their views were being taken seriously, and they could moreover see that the government wanted to proceed on the basis of consensus. That is not to say that the discussions were easy, because they were often difficult. They did, however, produce a unanimous report by the Low Pay Commission. And while it was subsequently dealt a blow by the government not fully accepting it, this was more the product of tension between the Treasury (Gordon Brown) and the DTI (Margaret Beckett), than about the reality of the policy. In this context, the fundamental point to remember is that whereas employers had argued in late 1997 that anything above £3
would result in economic chaos, the social partner process resulted in a mutual agreement of £3.60. Moreover, although there was some initial hesitation concerning the implementation of the minimum wage from 1 April 1999, there has subsequently been very little discussion about this matter. 
A lack of details
The problems that surrounded the negotiating process on Working Time (or lack of it) had a direct impact on the manner in which the Regulations were implemented. There were two particular issues associated with this. The first concerned the instructions that the government provided to employers. In this context, it was evident that the lack of a social partner consultation process produced a lower standard of guidelines than could have otherwise been achieved. This point was noted by all correspondents for this research, and was further illustrated by the differing levels of advice offered, as highlighted in tables 1 and 2. Other disparities between the advice offered by the DTI and professional organisations included definitions regarding on-call workers that had to sleep on site, the question of unmeasured working time and the issue of travelling time (see table   2 ). In these three areas the DTI guidance was unclear and left a great deal of scope for interpretation, resulting in some employers going against government advice.
This included the National Health Service Executive, which stressed that 'those workers who are required by their employer to be at their place of work and sleeping- Of other points, the DTI position on travelling time was equally blurred as it provided no guidelines on whether time spent sleeping on a plane was working time or not, which resulted in many major companies concluding that travelling time was working time.
ix This was based on the assumption that although employees may not have been working while they were travelling, they were nevertheless in the course of their employment and that if they did not classify this as working time then they would be exposing themselves from the point of view of personal injury law.
x In both these cases the DTI had therefore favoured a minimalist position that did not set concrete objectives. In this context, the degree of implementation would be established at company level, with the intention of making the impact on industry as minimal as possible. This strategy did, of course, contradict the objective of the Directive to establish a uniform standard. The second problem concerned the dearth of information that was available to business and trade union representatives, who spent much of July and August 1998
speculating as to what the specific detail of the Regulations would be. This was because they had not been privy to the same level of information as would have been the case had there been a social partner process. The resulting effect of this was to leave many organisations unprepared for the implementation of the Regulations, a difficulty that was further accentuated because they were only provided with the government's guidelines in September, just weeks before the Regulations took effect.
xi This situation obviously impacted on the quality of advice that was provided, as well as its very timing. As a TUC official commented, 'it would have been much easier to manage implementation if the Regulations had been part of a negotiated process, which would then have reduced the number of complaints from employers'. xii This was a view equally held by the CBI.
xiii This state of affairs prompted many employers to make individual decisions regarding who was or was not covered by the Regulations. For most, the crucial issue was to establish who would not be covered. In the case of the 48-hour limit, some companies took the unilateral decision to exempt whole tiers of upper management from this provision as well as insisting that new graduate recruits sign opt-outs. And although this clearly flouts the spirit of the Regulations, which provides the example of senior executives, many businesses considered it to be an acceptable practice.
(Many of these employees are, of course, not union members.).
Scope and coverage
So what has been the effect of the Regulations on British employment practices? First of all, the 48-hour week provision has not had a significant impact in changing working practices. All of the companies that were contacted for this research had contracted weekly hours of 40-hours or less, while they also noted a movement away from the use of overtime. And when employees did work in excess of 48-hours, they did so for only a short period of time, such as the Christmas sales. At the other end of the spectrum, the 48-hour week has had little impact in curtailing the number of hours worked by managers. The reality of this situation can be traced back to the manner in which the Regulations were implemented, with their being no social partner involvement. This could have been different, as the government had plenty of time to think about involving the unions and employers. We have to remind ourselves that the process of consultation did not commence until April 1998, one month short of a year after Labour took office. The second point to bear in mind is that a negotiated reduction in hours, rather than creating a blanket provision, would have avoided some of the bureaucracy that companies have had to face in recording hours of work, as it would initially have permitted a higher number of weekly hours. The third point is that the government was aware that Ireland adopted a negotiated reduction in working hours and such a path was therefore not a new one (Ireland, 1997) . xviii Such changes may have resulted in a different outcome, with the likelihood of reducing the continued effort spent by Ministers and officials on this subject.
That is not to say that the Regulations are not important. They are. For the first time in recent history a British government has provided workers with important employment rights, many of whom had no or only few existing entitlements. It is unlikely that these new benefits will, however, benefit all, as many workers continue to be employed in sweatshops on the fringes of the economy, while the government has only provided few resources to enforce the Regulations. There are, in fact, fewer than 10 Health and Safety Executive enforcing officers. But, the point to remember is that although the government might not be able to examine the working practices of all the sweatshop operators, it is able to tackle the conditions of work faced by those in the mainstream of economy.
